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PANEL DISCUSSION"
EGON GUTTMAN
SEYMOUR J.RUBIN
DETLEV F. VAGTS
AMBASSADOR KRISTER WAHLBACK
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I would like to ask Professor Vagts a question. I think there has been a tendency in the public debate to talk
about neutrality as though it is a single choice and complete package,
and the presentations this morning have made clear or reminded us
that there are really many choices that are made. I would be interested if you could address the question of whether the law on neutrality, specifically dealing with the right to trade with belligerents,
ought to be subject to any limitations. For example, at what point in
trade do deposits into banks of what we euphemistically referred to
as "non-monetary gold" become complicity in crimes? Should there
be limits on these rights that reflect those moral complexities?
PROFESSOR DETLEV F. VAGTS: Well, not strictly in the law of
neutrality. There are some limitations on the right of a belligerent
state to take property. There is a reason to believe that a neutral state
who takes that category of property, knowing of its origins, is, in the
international sense, guilty of fencing. Now, curiously, the Hague
Convention on land warfare, while forbidding pillaging of private
property and forbidding the taking of art treasures, specifically permits the taking of monetary gold. This is stated in somewhat ambiguous terms, but the convention does seem to say to that extent the
old conditions of "woe to the vanquished" continue. It is interesting.
Switzerland has been rather shy about taking that position, preferring
to talk about being a bona fide purchaser and the like, which was
* The panel discussion took place at the Conference on Neutrality, Morality.
and the Holocaust, which took place at the American University Washington Col-
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rather implausible. But there was some showing that yes, it was
within the bounds of a belligerent's rights, having conquered another
country, to dip into its treasury. If one were to sit down and recodify
all those rules, maybe one should say that it is not all right, but nobody has done so. I think there is a pretty good ground for saying
that taking up indirectly the property that was pillaged is wrong, this
is a logical part of the scheme of things.
PROFESSOR SEYMOUR J. RUBIN: This is an aspect in which I have a

tremendously strong interest because this was basically the aspect we
all negotiated with the neutrals back in 1943 and in 1946. This issue
is still under discussion. As I said before, I headed the team negotiating with the Swedes and was the deputy in connection with the
Swiss. In this situation, we are not talking about property that was
pillaged by an occupying troop. The Germans came into Belgium
and so forth and they picked up the gold, but that does not necessarily mean that the Belgians did not have a right to get it back, even
under the laws of neutrality. In the 1907 Convention, the occupying
power has the power and the authority to take such gold, but that did
not necessarily mean that after the war there was no claim against it.
And then, most of the property we are talking about was not monetary gold, it was stuff that was pillaged either by the armies of the
German forces during the period of occupation, or more significantly, from people who were not being occupied-from the Jews,
the Gypsies, the Socialists, the Communists, anyone who had property and was an object of special attention, shall we say, by the Nazis. I do not think that the United States, during the course of the
war, back when I was doing economic warfare work, really said that
the Swedes could not trade with Germany. We did black list a lot of
Swedish companies-as we did with a lot of Spanish, Swiss, and Argentinean companies-because of what we considered to be excessive trade, trade that was not necessary in order to get fuel or food
supplies into a neutral country, but trade that was above and beyond
that which was necessary. As you undoubtedly know, there were a
number of Swedish companies that were on the black list and actually the negotiations with the Swiss were largely, from the Swiss
point of view, in order to have the black list removed and the freezing that we had imposed upon Swiss companies removed and lifted.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: There is a question among the scholars as to
the effects of activities by neutrals. It seems there are a lot of things
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that neutral countries can do that are below the boards. In other
words, there were a lot of things done by the United States from before we ever actually entered the war. President Roosevelt made a
moral choice when, as I understand it, he allowed British intelligence
to operate rather effectively in the United States, which I assume
helped Britain's war efforts despite the fact that it might have evoked
a domestic outcry here and even might have raised the hackles of
some of our internal police agencies like the FBI.
PROFESSOR VAGTS: When the German government declared war
on the United States in December 1941, it said that its reasons for
doing so were egregious breaches of the law of neutrality by the
United States. In particular, they mentioned the lend-lease program
in which the United States government furnished arms to Britain. It
mentioned the destroyer bases deal, and they mentioned the fact that
United States Naval units were making aggressive patrols and attacking German U-boats in the north Atlantic. But I think it was
fairly evident, even to Roosevelt and to Attorney General Jackson,
who had to testify at these things, that those were departures from the
law of neutrality.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Dr. Howard Ural. I wanted to
ask Professor Vagts how Ambassador Wahlb~ck's comprehensive
self-defense argument holds up in the neutrality jurisprudence of the
last half-century.
PROFESSOR VAGTS: I took his argument to be a very contextual
one, one which said you have to judge Sweden's choice not to become a warring party in the balance of the military and other factors
that were involved. You notice that this was different from the point
of view of every other country in World War II that made those decisions. It is worth remembering that the only two countries that went
to war against Germany were Britain and France. And I think it is
fair to say that they did so on the basis, kind of, of preventive selfdefense. They have done Czechoslovakia, and if they do Poland, we
are next. And therefore, it is a simple matter of fighting now, rather
than later, under presumably somewhat better circumstances. I would
say the episodes in which countries have gone to war against horrors
somewhere else when self-defense was not a consideration are few
and far between.
AMBASSADOR KRISTER WAHLBACK: I would agree.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Cybil Milton. I had two questions of fact for Ambassador Wahlbick. As far as I know, the Swedish government was not directly involved in the appointment of
Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest. If there was a Swedish governmental
policy involvement, I would be most interested in learning more
about this. The second question of fact involves the comment on the
deportation and fate of Norwegian Jews. As far as I know, Sweden
was unsuccessful in assisting and preventing the deportation or rescue of Norwegian Jews.
I also had a more general comment about the issue of monetary
gold. Monetary gold and non-monetary gold are very convenient
sorting devices. Unfortunately, as both the Eizenstat Report and the
Nuremberg documents of 1945-1949 showed in very extensive form,
monetary gold is often corrupted by the personnel, because gold as a
form that can be resmelted, mixed, and add-mixed with other forms
of gold or metal. So this type of definition, that was a matter of convenience in 1945, is today viewed in retrospect under slightly different terminology and with slightly more moral purview.
AMBASSADOR WAHLBACK: Concerning your first question about
Raoul Wallenberg, no. The Swedish government was, of course, intimately involved, because he was sent to Budapest as a member of
our diplomatic service and one of our collaborators in our Budapest
delegation. So it was a process of consultation between the Swedish
foreign minister, the Americans, and the World Jewish Congress.

Concerning the deportation of Norwegian Jews to Germany, it is
true that almost half of the Jewish Norwegian community were deported by ship from Norway to Germany and to the extermination
camps. However, before that happened, and during the German's
process of rounding up of Norwegian Jews, slightly more than half of
the Norwegian Jewish community were able to slip over the borders
to Sweden and find safety there. The Swedish government made, of
course, representations to the German government to discontinue
these deportations, but these were ineffectual.
Concerning the third comment about monetary gold and private
gold, I think your description was quite correct and one of the main
tasks of the Swedish commission on Jewish assets, which is working
right now and of which I am a member, is in fact to try to establish to
what extent the amount of tainted gold or looted gold that we re-
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ceived from Germany also contained private gold. That is a very hard
task to establish for technical and other reasons. But there are ways
to make estimates and there will be a report published on precisely
this issue, probably before mid-summer.
PROFESSOR RUBIN: On the non-monetary gold issue, of course,
there was a distinction made in the Paris Reparations Agreement in
1945 between monetary and non-monetary gold. Non-monetary gold
was supposed to go to the International Committee on Refugees, or
perhaps the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees. One of the
difficult decisions made in Paris in 1945 had to do with identification. One of the decisions that I think is not noted very much these
days was when the Paris Reparations Conference decided that there
would be no attempt to return Belgium gold to Belgium, or French
gold to France, or Dutch gold to Holland, and so forth. All the gold,
the monetary gold, would be put into a common pool and then the
claimants would come forward and present their claims, and what
was there would be divided up. That is one reason why Albania has
received a little bit of gold recently. I have indicated the difficulty
with respect to identification. I know that experts can identify gold
and maybe you could have identified a particular bar with the Reichbank stamp on it as having come from Belgian gold, or Dutch gold,
or from somebody else's gold. But the people, I think, of good will
and considerable knowledge and concern at the time in 1945, decided that that effort would be futile, difficult, and produce more
contention than good results.
So far as non-monetary gold was concerned, of course, the consensus was that it was all going to go to the Inter-governmental
Committee on Refugees, and again the problem of identification
arose. The rings, the bracelets, the inlays, and so forth were not easily identifiable by one person or another, and therefore even though it
was possible to find a particular ring with an inscription on it that
some person could have identified, the 1945 Allied Conference decided that all of these assets would be put into a pool that would be
assigned to the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees and
would be used for the relief of survivors of the Holocaust. Interestingly enough, the Paris Reparations Agreement also agreed that $25
million out of the reparations funds, the German assets in the neutral
countries, would be put into the hands of the Inter-governmental
Committee on Refugees and would be used for relief. That money
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was supposed to go to the relief of concentration camp victims. I
have always found it a little curious, interesting if not a little curious,
is that the Paris Reparation Agreement said that these assets not only
go to people who were victims of concentration camps, but also specifically says money is to go to the relief of ordinary prisoners of
war, that is people who were in ordinary German prisoner of war
camps. I always found that phrase a little bit difficult to accept. I
cannot think that a German prisoner of war camp as being a very
pleasant place to be in, but that distinction was made there. Was that
money to go to Nazi persecution victims rather than ordinary prisoners of war?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Robert Wineberg from the International
Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists ("IAJLJ"), one of the cosponsors of the Conference. Before putting forward my question, I
would just like to take the opportunity to thank all the speakers on
behalf of the IAJLJ for participating in this extremely important conference. My question is to the Swedish Ambassador. In the years after World War II, Sweden was often held up as an example of the
model social democracy and an example of the tremendous progress
made in areas from industrial relations, to the end product of prisons,
to economic and social equality. Sweden was generally considered a
paragon. My question is whether the people in the political party or
parties who brought about that reputation for Sweden in the postWorld War II years were in, or frozen out of the government during
World War II? Or more generally, who were the people, and what
was the domestic politics of the people who controlled the Swedish
government during World War II? Was it right, left, center, or otherwise?
AMBASSADOR WAHLBACK: Well, it was a national government

composed of all major parties. The only party that did not take part in
the government in the 1939-1945 period was the small Communist
party. However, this national government was led by the Social
Democrats, by a Social Democratic Prime Minister, and during the
parliamentary elections in September 1940, the Social Democrats
had their greatest representation ever. I think they gained on their
own something like fifty-one percent of the vote. Even though it was
a national government, a large majority in parliament was the Social
Democratic party, who as you mentioned also championed the development of the welfare state in the 1930s and after the war. If one
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were to try and discuss the issue in terms of party political consternations in Sweden, that is a bit difficult, because when we were facing these German demands for concession, the normal pattern was
that about half of the Social Democratic members of the government
were very decidedly opposed to these concessions. The Social
Democrats were sometimes supported by one, two, or three of the
non-socialist members. And then there were roughly about an equal
number of members of the government, including some members of
the Social Democrats who were in favor of considering the concession in question, and in practice it was mostly the Prime Minister,
who was a Social Democrat, who made the final decision. But, I
would say it would be wrong to discuss it in party/political terms.
There was fairly great unanimity about the main lines of the policy
pursued in parliament and the government.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Professor Rubin, from what I understand, not

only did the decision in 1945 mean that they would not try to distinguish the gold from one country to another, but they also did not
particularly distinguish between monetary gold and gold that was
converted into monetary gold or what looked like monetary gold that
was taken from victims. Even though, if they did an accounting of
the gold, they knew the Germans did not have that much gold to
trade. The impression you gave is that the victims' gold went to the
refugees while monetary gold went back to the countries, except for
the little bit that still remains in the Federal Reserve and in London.
But that is contrary to what we have been given to understand over
the last couple of years, that there was a mixture of victim gold and
monetary gold, and that the parties took all of the gold and returned it
to the countries, so that today there is victims' gold in the vaults of
various countries. Gold that was returned through the Tripartite
Commission. Am I wrong?
PROFESSOR RUBIN: I think that is very largely correct. I think there

is a need for a couple of modifications or clarifications. A great deal
of victims' gold was found in Germany as victims' gold: the sacks of
teeth, rings, and so forth. Eventually, those sacks were turned over to
the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees and converted into
cash. The cash went to the cause of refugee relief. It was quite well
known, I think, that some of the victims' gold had been resmelted
and converted into gold bars. But in 1945, so far as the people in
Paris were concerned, I think the possibility of identifying victims'
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gold in one bar of gold as distinguished from another bar of gold was
very, very remote. It was also thought that resmelting had not occurred in very large quantities. Whether it had or not, I just do not
know. But I do know that a considerable amount of gold was found
in the original sacks into which it had been put. What had not been
swiped by German soldiers or by civilians was turned over to refugee
organizations. Some, undoubtedly, is in the bars of so-called monetary gold, and perhaps some of that is in the hands of the countries to
which monetary gold was returned, or in the Federal Reserve Bank in
New York where, I guess, there are about seven tons of that gold still
left.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Just to follow up, maybe not in the form of a
question but in the form of a statement. The evidence that seems to
be coming up now is that not just some victims' gold was mixed into
the monetary gold, but it may be as much as one-third of the gold
that was declared monetary gold was obtained from victims, which is
coming out in several different research efforts that are going on. In
fact, it is even suggested that the United States Federal Reserve may
have melted down some victims gold, in the form of rings and
bracelets, and converted it into monetary gold and shipped it off after
the war.
PROFESSOR RUBIN: I would not dispute that. I do not know.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: In light of the difficulties of tracing all of the
gold at this point, I wonder if you have any thoughts about what
kinds of regulations might be appropriate for banks to adopt to prevent this kind of situation from developing in the future.
PROFESSOR RUBIN: Well, I trust very much that this kind of situation will not arise in the future. But I am not sure exactly what kind
of regulations banks could adopt. I do think that the transparency
with respect to banking transactions, which has reasonably increased
in the course of the past ten-fifteen years, is a very decisive and very
good factor. The Swiss were notorious, infamous, whatever the word
may be, for banking secrecy and so forth. The Swiss have gradually
improved on the openness of their banking system and so forth, and
so much so that some people say that there is very little banking secrecy left there. I suppose that kind of disclosure would be highly desirable. How you could prevent a particular bar of gold, or how you
should ensure that particular bar is somebody's bar of gold rather
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than another's, I do not know. It has a stamp on it and it looks like
monetary gold. Nevertheless, a lot of the Reichbank's gold, of
course, was stolen or resmelted victims' gold mixed in with the
monetary gold. What regulations could prevent this? I do not know.
PROFESSOR EGON GUTTMAN: If I may just ask you a question of

Ambassador Wahlbick. You stated that although the departure from
legal neutrality was considered a breach of morality and upset some
Swedish citizens, the sale of iron ore to Germany did not seem to
raise a similar objection. My question here is, are there any records
between Sweden and Germany as a result of these trading activities,
and if this balance is favorable to Sweden, how is Sweden feeling
about contributing to the reparation activities that are now going on
in Switzerland and other places?
AMBASSADOR WAHLBACK: Well, in fact, if we look at the Swedish/German trade exchange during the war, what happened was that
the Germans wanted us to extend credits-state credits-because
they sometimes had great difficulty in delivering the amounts of
coal, coke, and other products that would be equivalent in value to
the iron ore and other products that they received from us. Such demands for state credits were always turned down. The Germans were
made to, they were in fact forced to either deliver coal and coke by
making extra effort at the expense of other areas of their economy, or
during some periods, to pay in gold. It was in that connection that
some gold came into the possession of the Swedish Reichbank. But if
you look at this Swedish/German trade exchange over the whole war
period, in fact it ended with the Germans having delivered more to us
than we to them. So, in fact, we owed them some, not a very considerable amount, but some debt at the end of the war.
PROFESSOR GUTrMAN: In the form of gold or in the form of products, commodities exchange?
AMBASSADOR WAHLBACK: Well, in principle, the Swedish/German trade was based on clearing, so no. It was based on the
idea of an equivalent value between what they deliver to us and we
to them. Money transactions were not involved. It was special accounts in the Reichbanks of both Sweden and Germany.
PROFESSOR GuTrMAN: My question ultimately leads to this.

Whether there was any awareness in Sweden that some of the gold
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they received might have been victim gold as opposed to monetary
gold?
AMBASSADOR WAHLBACK: In the diary notes of the President of

the Swedish Reichbank, you can find suspicions fairly early. This Is
now a subject that is under investigation, and I am not quite sure that
I have all facts in my head. There were some diary notes in his
handwriting, I think, as early as 1940, indicating suspicions that may
be part of the gold that the Germans gave to us could be monetary
gold robbed from Austria or the Czech Republic, and later on from
the Netherlands and Belgium. But there are, as far as I know, no indications that they ever suspected that victims' gold would be involved. At least not in the written documents, either private or official documents. But again, I would make a reservation in the sense
that the report on precisely this issue is not yet finished.
PROFESSOR RUBIN: In the agreement made in August 1946, with

Mr. Justice Sandstrom of Sweden, myself, and with British and
French representatives, there is a provision that appears in connection with looted gold. There was, I think, no question that the Swedish authorities knew that some of the gold that they were receiving
was looted gold. But that does not answer the question whether they
knew it was victims' gold or gold taken from other central banks. As
far as I can recall, and I was very much in these negotiations, there
was nothing put forward, even by the gold experts in the United
States-for example, Dr. Otto Fletcher, who worked with me and
who was an ex-Austrian Jewish national and an expert in this-there
was nothing put forward specifically that I can recall that said that
any substantial amount of victims' gold was involved in this transfer
of gold to Sweden from Germany. Incidentally, I think the Swedish
government should be congratulated because one of the big problems
with respect to our negotiations with Switzerland was Swiss claims
against Germany in connection with German assets in Switzerland.
We had to allocate fifty percent of what was found there to settle the
Swiss claims against Germany. So, the Swiss came out having extended credits to Germany, private or governmental, while apparently Sweden did not.
PROFESSOR VAGTS: There is still a lot of uncertainty about the
question of victim gold-the "victim" subcategory of the category
"looted" gold. While a great deal was known for a long time, a lot of
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these cries of "look what wonderful discoveries I have made" are
really quite unjustified because they have been around for decades.
There is still some uncertainty there. It is worth noting that the
Eizenstat report, or more properly the Slany report, does say that
there is no convincing evidence that any neutral state knew that it
was trading victim gold. Going through that report as carefully as I
could, the figures I saw about the victim gold that was transported
outside of Germany was, at one point, in the range of forty-four kilograms, which is not really very much. At that level, one is really uncertain about the evidence. The overwhelming bulk of the victim
gold was intercepted in Germany, in camps there.
PROFESSOR GUTTMAN: My question was induced by your earlier
statement regarding monetary gold as being lootable; so neutrals
would have a clear conscience in taking it. But clearly there can be
no clear conscience when we are dealing in victim gold, as difficult
as it is to obtain it.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My interest in this gold question. Basically,
what I do not understand here is how could a central banker, whether
in Sweden, Switzerland, wherever, not know that there was nonmonetary gold mixed in with the monetary gold. In other words,
what obviously happens in a financial system and what happened in
Nazi Germany was that most of the gold that was taken was melted
down. Whether these were rings or other jewelry taken from individuals, it was melted down and put into the monetary gold stocks of
the Reichbank. The Reichbank then held these gold bars. Whether it
was then found after the war, in the mines, or went to Switzerland or
other places, that gold was originally, or a lot of it was, nonmonetary gold. My real question is why anybody who is a central
banker in any of these countries could not have truly understood that.
About $80 million of the gold that was looted by the Nazis was actually private gold, even though it was declared monetary gold after the
war. This gold was looted when the Nazis marched into these countries and declared that all gold must be turned over from private individuals to the central bank that was then run by the Nazis. So all of
that gold clearly was, and was understood to be, victims' gold. I
mean, that was not something that was unknown. The question becomes whether all the other gold that must have flowed in through
that bank, so even though there is no precise statement from a central
bank stating, "I can see that within this gold bar there is so much of it
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that came from concentration camp victims." They must have had
known that. If they did not know this, they could not have been in the
position that they were in, as chief of central bankers and experts on
financial systems. I just do not quite understand how that came about
and even in this part of the Paris negotiations which took place on
that subject. Thank you.
PROFESSOR RUBIN: Well, of course, a lot of knowledge has turned
up now that was not available then. One possible explanation for the
small amount of non-monetary gold that was found in the gold bars
that were in the vaults of the central banks is that non-monetary gold
is, to sort of use a different word, contaminated. It has steel and iron
and a variety of things that makes it different from monetary gold.
Bankers, ordinarily, are very meticulous about the kinds of quality of
the gold they are taking. So generally, monetary gold was in the
sense pure gold, and the gold that goes into a ring or bracelet or
something like that is not pure gold. So, that may not have been all
that people may have thought, because perhaps the non-monetary
gold was not actually melted down to the extent that it was actually
purified. Certainly, there is a lot of evidence now that a large amount
was melted down, purified, and turned into so-called monetary gold.
There was also a lot of this gold found in the salt mines in Merkers
and picked up in Germany still in the sacks, into which people had
been forced to put their bracelets or their rings. The Nazis at the crematoriums also put their victims' gold inlays into these bags.
PROFESSOR GUTTMAN: I have another question, just a final question to Ambassador Wahlbfick. I am directing my question to him
because at the moment he is neutral on this panel. How far has Sweden been able to determine that there was a private transfer of assets
by people subsequently discovered to have been involved in the Nazi
activities across Europe? I am thinking of the parallel of what you
find in South America, where there are some very well adjusted and
economically well-off people who made their wealth most likely
through the activities of the Nazi SS. Have you had an investigation
of this issue in Sweden?
AMBASSADOR WAHLBACK: Oh, yes. That is, in fact, one of the
main tasks of the Commission on Jewish Assets in Sweden, to investigate the extent to which Jewish property may have been transferred to Sweden as a result of the persecution against the Jews on
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the part of the Nazis. And, of course, to the extent that this happened
in a way that meant the Jewish people were robbed of their property
or extorted or forced to sell it at low prices to Swedes, for instance.
That would be totally unacceptable and that is one of the main objectives of our investigations. The problem is that Swedish businessmen did not seem, so far as we have been able to discover, to
have been very interested in taking over property that was in Germany-property owned by Jews who wanted to sell them for instance. It was not a very attractive business proposition to invest in
Germany, because Germany was a planned economy with chronological exchange or "devisen" problems. So it was very difficult to
get anything out of Germany if you took over a Jewish property and
managed it. Such cases, therefore, seem to have been extremely rare.
There are a lot of indications of offers on the part of Jewish enterprises, of approaches to Swedish banks for instance, asking for
Swedish interest in taking over this or that factory, but normally
these offers were not accepted. It does not seem to have had an interest.
PROFESSOR GUTTMAN: My question sought to discover what was
the reaction of the Swedish population to the activities of Nazi Germany. A population's reactions will influence what kind of neutrality
a country is going to adopt. At least a government that is in some
way democratic would have to bear that in mind. My question really
was the other way around. Is there any investigation of ex-Germans,
or ex-participants in German atrocities, to discover how these people
became wealthy in Sweden, so that people may have asked how does
this happened in Sweden?
AMBASSADOR WAHLBACK: Oh, I see. Okay, well, that issue was,
of course, crucial in the immediate post-war years, because all German assets in Sweden were confiscated. And to the extent that some
prominent Nazis who had made investments in Sweden, I do not recall really what the results were on that specific point. But to that
extent, assets were confiscated. One of our problems, and one of the
tasks of the present Commission on Jewish Assets, is to investigate
whether some German Jewish owners of property in Sweden had
their property confiscated, simply because they were Germans. That
would also simply be unacceptable in the sense that they were victims of wars. That is also one of the tasks with which we are also engaged in trying to clarify.
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PROFESSOR GUTTMAN: I would like to thank the panel for their
rather interesting explanations of things.

